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THE BRICKER AMENDMENT
THE FALLACIES IN THE CASE FOR
THE BRICKER AMENDMENT
Introduction
The existing constitutional arrangements for the making
and enforcing of treaties and the present constitutional
powers of the President to make executive and other agree-
ments with foreign countries have recently been under severe
attack. Since these arrangements and powers have on the
whole served us remarkably well under changing circum-
stances for more than a century and a half, it is proposed to
examine the development of this campaign and to analyze
the arguments that have been used to support it.
The principal goal of this forensic effort has been the adop-
tion of the Bricker amendment as reported out by the Senate
Judiciary Committee on June 4, 1953. The amendment did
not of course emerge suddenly out of a vacuum. Advocacy of
such a proposal was initiated chiefly by groups in the Ameri-
can Bar Association,2 and by Senator Bricker and other Sen-
ators associated with him. In the American Bar Association,
former President Frank E. Holman and the Standing Com-
1 Under the title of Senate Joint Resolution 1, it w.s reported favorably by a
vote of nine to five, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign'Relations Committee being
one of the dissenters. The text of the operative sections is as follows:
SECTION 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution
shall not be of any force or effect.
SECTION 2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United
States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.
SECTION 3. Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other
agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All such
agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties by this article.
2 The text reported out is essentially the language proposed by the American
Bar Association rather than that of the resolutions Senator Bricker originally intro-
duced. The American Bar Association and numerous state bar associations are on
record as favoring the proposal. The Section of International and Comparative Law
of that Association, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, the Phila-
delphia, Boston and St. Louis Bar Associations, The Federal Bar Association, and
the State Bars of Delaware, Missouri, and New Jersey are opposed. Lawyers are
thus divided on this important issue.
(551)
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mittee on Peace and Law through United Nations have been
the leaders in pointing out the alleged "dangers of treaty
law." These forces have urged vigorously the necessity of this
constitutional amendment to prevent their fears from being
realized.'
Any proposal to amend the Constitution warrants careful
scrutiny. Proponents of constitutional change should have
the burden of demonstrating that their amendment is re-
quired in order to correct known evils. The existing amend-
ments to the Constitution were adopted to overcome specific
abuses which had been clearly demonstrated in practice.
Have there been abuses of such importance to justify adop-
tion of the Bricker amendment or similar proposals? The
Bricker amendment calls for drastic changes in our traditional
constitutional arrangements in this area. What facts, legal
rulings, and arguments can be marshalled to support such a
radical proposal as the Bricker amendment?
United Nations Activities Creating Fear
The proponents have constantly argued that their amend-
ment is necessary to preserve the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights.! The reasons for believing no amendment is necessary
to achieve these laudable objectives are developed hereafter.
So far as the Bill of Rights is concerned, it is ironic that the
campaign for the Bricker amendment derived its initial
impetus from fears created in their minds by certain activities
of the United Nations that were intended to promote a
greater realization of human rights throughout -the world.
The proposals on which they have based their fears will be
discussed briefly.
3 Finch, The Treaty Clause Amendment: The Case for the Association, 38
A.B.A.J. 467 (1952).
4 SEN. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953). See also the statements of
Senator Bricker in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary on S. J). Res. 1 and S. J. Res. 43, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1953). S. J. Res.
43 embodies the language of the American Bar Association.
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The first measure was the passage in December, 1948, by
the General Assembly, without a dissenting voice and with
the United States voting affirmatively, of a Resolution pro-
claiming the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." The
Resolution was intended to be a recital of goals rather than
a legally binding commitment. The Declaration contained
not only provisions relating to what we call basic civil and
political rights but also statements of economic and social
objectives. The Declaration was not a treaty but a resolution
of the General Assembly which in legal theory does not have
the force of law. This was the position of our government as
to both its international and internal effects.5
Further cause for alarm was found in the adoption of the
Genocide Convention by the General Assembly at that same
time, an agreement which pledged the signers to prevent mass
annihilation of religious, racial, national and ethnical groups.
That Convention, in treaty form, was opened for signature
and ratification, and became effective on January 12, 1951,
after ratification by twenty States. Subsequently, additional
States have ratified. The United States is a signatory but has
never ratified the Convention. Hearings have been held by a
subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
but thus far neither the full committee nor the Senate itself
has considered the matter. In arguments for the Bricker
amendment, allegations have been made that the Convention,
after approval by the Senate, would immediately supersede
state law without further action by Congress. Is this conten-
tion sustainable?
Article V of the Convention reads in part as follows:'
5 For a development of this viewpoint and also a discussion of the Genocide
Convention and the Covenants on Human Rights discussed later in the text, see
MacChesney, International Protection of Human Rights in the United Nations, 47
N.W.U.L. REV. 198, 206-14 (1952).
6 Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions on the Genocide Convention, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 23-Feb. 9, 1950).
7 The text of the Convention is reprinted in 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 7, 8 (Supp.
1951).
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The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance
with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation
to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention ...
This provision was clearly intended by our State Depart-
ment representatives to require additional legislation by Con-
gress before the Convention became effective as internal law.
This intent was made clear to the other signatories. If there
is any doubt raised by the language used, an "understand-
ing" 8 to that effect at the time of ratification would surely
achieve this result.
Another charge made against the Convention is that it
provides for the trial of American citizens before an interna-
tional criminal court. The language of Article VI is sufficient
to negate such a contention; the relevant parts thereof pro-
viding:9
Persons charged.., shall be tried by a competent tribunal
of the State in the territory of which the act was committed,
or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction
with respect to those contracting parties which shall have
accepted its jurisdiction. [Emphasis supplied]
No such tribunal has yet been created, and the United States
has certainly not accepted any such jurisdiction. The United
States has participated in the drafting of a Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court,"° but this project has not
been completed. No decision has been made as to signing
such a statute, let alone submitting it to the Senate for ap-
proval.
The United Nations program which has aroused the most
alarm is also still in the drafting stage. The Covenants on
Human Rights, in draft treaty form, are in two parts." One
8 An "understanding" as distinguished from a "reservation" which would re-
quire the consent of the other parties that have ratified and perhaps of the other
signatories.
9 See supra note 7, at 8.
10 The text of the draft is reprinted in 39 A.B.A.J. 1103 (1953). For arguments
pro and con on this proposal, see Parker, An International Criminal Court: The
Case for its Adoption, and Finch, An International Criminal Court: The Case
Against its Adoption, both printed in 38 A.B.A.J. 641 and 644 (1952).
11 18 DEP'T STATE BULL. 195 (1948).
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Covenant deals with civil and political rights. A second Cov-
enant contains so-called economic and social rights. It has
been frequently charged that these Covenants, if adopted as
treaties by the United States, would have an immediate
revolutionary impact 2 on the domestic law of this country,
especially the asserted reserved rights of the individual states
with respect to the relations between the individual and the
government. The further allegation is made that the adoption
of the Covenants would result in a "downgrading" of the pro-
tections afforded the individual by our own Bill of Rights.
Determined efforts were made by our government to meet
these objections to the Covenants by drafting changes, but the
criticisms continue with respect to their present language.
Do these objections have merit? So far as the claim that the
Covenants, if approved by the Senate, would be immediately
effective as internal law, Art. 2, Par. 2 of the Civil Covenant
is designed to avoid this result. If the language remains am-
biguous, more specific expression of this purpose could be
adopted, or an "understanding" as in the case of the similar
provision in the Genocide Convention would be effective.
Article 2, Par. 1 of the Economic Covenant makes clear that
further legislation after ratification would be required."
The more substantial objection that the Covenants would
invade the reserved rights of the individual states is not war-
ranted in view of the present language of the "federal-state"
clause as proposed by the United States in draft Article 50 of
the Civil Covenant and draft Article 28 of the Economic
12 The charge is frequently based on remarks by John P. Humphrey, then Di-
rector of the Human Rights Division of the U.N. Secretariat. Humphrey, Interna-
tional Protection of Human Rights. 255 ANNALS 15 (Jan. 1948). The full text of his
remarks shows that he believed enactment of a human rights program was an
essential element of a program for peace. He emphasized its "revolutionary" char-
acter in portraying the difficulties to be surmounted. See typical use of his remarks
in SEN. REP. supra note 4, at 6.
13 The text of the 1952 draft may be found in the Department of State Bulletin
of July 7, 1952, at p. 23 et seq. Mimeographed 1953 draft shows no changes in the
articles referred to in the text.
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Covenant. 4 Both articles make explicit that the Federal Gov-
ernment would acquire no additional power to legislate by
the adoption of the Covenants. This is the alleged objective
of the "which" clause in the Bricker amendment.
The further claim that the Covenants "downgrade" our
Bill of Rights is without substance in light of the specific pro-
visions against "downgrading" in Article 5 of the Civil
Covenant and in Article 5 of the Economic Covenant. 5 Even
if there were merit in these various objections, they do not
serve to justify enactment of a constitutional amendment
since the Eisenhower administration has stated officially that
it will not sign either of the Covenants regardless of what
provisions they contain upon completion. 6 Such an advance
adamant position was probably adopted for the purpose of
defeating the serious dangers involved in the Bricker amend-
ment. This announcement did not serve to lessen the cam-
paign for that amendment, but it seems an adequate answer
to claims based on the draft Covenants.
The proponents of constitutional change relied heavily
on one other development connected with these programs of
the United Nations. In Sei Fujii v. State,7 an appellate court
in California held its Alien Land Law invalid, relying princi-
pally on the argument that Articles 55 and 56 of the United
Nations Charter, as a treaty, had the effect under the Suprem-
acy Clause of our Constitution of superseding the state law.
This holding was contrary to the position our government had
officially taken on this question. On appeal, the Supreme
14 In meetings of the Human Rights Commission since the writing of this text,
it is reported that the United States did not support a federal-state clause, and that
the Commission by a vote of eight to seven adopted the following clause: Draft
Article 71: "The provisions of the Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal
Statutes without any limitations or exceptions." See discussion in 16 U.N. BULL. 298
(April 15, 1954).
15 Article 5 of the Civil Covenant (1953), is unchanged from Article 4 of the
1952 draft cited in note 13, supra.
16 Statements by Secretary of State Dulles, Hearings, supra note 4, at 825.
17 217 P.2d 481, rehearing denied, 218 P.2d 595 (Cal. App. 1950).
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Court of California upheld this decision18 on the basis that
the state law violated the Fourteenth Amendment of our
Constitution. In its opinion, that court specifically rejected
the reasoning below as to the self-executing nature of these
charter provisions. The view of the highest California court
seems clearly right to the writer but it has not stilled the
proponents' fears based on these provisions of the Charter,
as will be noted hereafter.
Judicial Interpretations
This, in brier, was the immediate origin of the campaign
for the Bricker amendment. In addition to the developments
concerning the United Nations just discussed, the advocates
of a change in the treaty provisions of the Constitution have
urged vigorously that there is a "gap" in those provisions and
that recent Supreme Court decisions construing the treaty
power have made clear the need for closing this "gap." The
"gap" is said to arise from the language of the Supremacy
Clause"9 providing that statutes must be in "pursuance" of
the Constitution whereas treaties need be made only on the
"authority" of the United States. The difference in language
is emphasized despite the historic reason for this difference
in the desire to maintain the validity of treaties entered into
under the Confederation prior to the Constitution.
Their most basic contention is essentially that amendment
is necessary in order to preserve federal constitutional gov-
ernment. In effect, they urge that the present scope of the
treaty power constitutes a change in our form of government
18 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
10 U.S. CONST., Art. Vi, CI. 2, reads as follows: "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary not-
withstanding."
20 See Myers, Treaty and Law Under the Constitution, 26 DEP'T STATE BULL.
371 (1952).
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from that envisaged by the framers of our Constitution. Basic
to this broad charge are their propositions that the existing
treaty power is unlimited; that treaties can override the Con-
stitution; and that the use of an allegedly unlimited treaty
power can completely absorb the rights of the states and thus
lead inevitably to an all-powerful central government.2'
In support of these claims much is made of the opinion of
the Supreme Court rendered by Mr. Justice Holmes in the
famous migratory bird case, Missouri v. Holland,22 decided
in 1920 with two justices dissenting. In that case, the State of
Missouri challenged the validity of regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of Agriculture pursuant to an act of Con-
gress based on the Migratory Bird Treaty with Great Britain,
acting for Canada. Prior to the negotiation of this treaty, a
similar act of Congress not based on a treaty had been de-
clared unconstitutional by two lower federal courts. Pending
appeal of these earlier cases, the treaty had been ratified.
Thus the general problem was raised as to whether matters
could be effectively regulated under the treaty power that
could not be validly regulated under the powers of Congress
in purely domestic affairs. In opposition, it was vigorously
urged by Missouri that to sustain this national power would
deprive the states of control over their internal affairs and
that the treaty was forbidden by the Tenth Amendment.
These contentions were rejected.
While the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes contains broad
language, it does not say that the treaty power is unlimited.
21 Hearings, supra note 4. The statements of the individual proponents appear
by page number as follows: Senator Bricker p. 2; Holman, pp. 129, 1216; Schweppe,
pp. 33, 1186, 1128; Rix, pp. 75, 1024; Finch, p. 1104; Deutsch, p. 115; Hatch, p. 83;
Ober, p. 167 and Judge Phillips, pp. 984, 1022. With the exception of Senator
Bricker and Mr. Holman, these gentlemen are members of the Peace and Law Com-
mittee of the American Bar Association. The references above are to their complete
testimony, and further reference will not be made thereto when the text refers in
general terms to the views of the proponents.
22 252 U.S. 416 (1920). Admirers of the late Mr. Justice Holmes will note with
interest Sen. Bricker's reference to the author of this opinion. "It was a Democratic
judge that wrote the opinion." Hearings, supra note A, at 1263.
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The decision in itself makes clear that the validity of an
exercise of the treaty power is ultimately determined by the
Supreme Court. From this and other opinions of the Supreme
Court,23 the conclusion can be properly drawn that there are
real limits to the treaty power. These are that the treaty
must deal in good faith with a question of international con-
cern and that no provision of the treaty may violate any
fundamental constitutional guarantees.24
This opinion is nonetheless constantly cited by the Bricker
proponents as standing for the proposition that treaties can
override the Constitution and that the decision did not reflect
the intent of the framers. This latter view is difficult to under-
stand. The reverse would seem to be true. In several import-
ant early treaties provisions inconsistent with state law were
included, and these provisions were upheld by the Supreme
Court.25 This is surely persuasive contemporaneous evidence
that treaties were intended to be superior to state law. To cite
one example, the Jay Treaty of 1794 with Great Britain, the
first important one under the Constitution, provided for re-
ciprocal confirmation of land titles.26 It would be hard to find
a clearer case than title to land as a matter governed by state
law in the absence of treaty.
The contention that the decision means that treaties can
override the Constitution is equally difficult to maintain. The
power to make treaties was specifically conferred on the na-
tional Government, while the states were explicitly excluded
from foreign affairs. Concentration of the treaty power in the
23 E.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890), and The Cherokee Tobacco,
11 Wall. 616, 620-21 (U.S. 1870).
24 For fuller development of this and other arguments made in this article in
opposition to the Bricker amendment, see The Treaty Power and the Constitution:
The Case Against Amendment, by the writer in collaboration with Professors Mc-
Dougal of Yale, Mathews of Ohio State, Oliver of California, and Dean Ribble of
Virginia. 40 A.B.AJ. 203 (1954).
25 See Chafee, Amending the Constitution to Cripple Treaties, 12 LA. L. REv.
345, 359-364 (1952).
26 This provision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, 7 Cranch 603 (U.S. 1813).
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national Government is a necessity of federalism if it is to
operate effectively in this area. The treaty power is in truth
a delegated power. Like the power over interstate com-
merce,27 it is supreme within its proper scope, and the Tenth
Amendment does not stand in the way. From a practical, as
distinguished from a legal standpoint, it is only sensible that
the national Government should be able to deal efficiently
with matters that the individual states are unable to control.
In the migratory bird case, the national interest in the
preservation of an essential food supply was properly not
sacrificed for abstractions concerning states' rights. The de-
cision in Missouri v. Holland was not a revolutionary develop-
ment. It merely confirmed the framers' intention that the
nation should speak with one voice when dealing with other
nations on matters requiring international regulation and
adjustment.
The "Which" Clause Coverage
In place of this desirable arrangement the Bricker pro-
ponents, in the famous "which" clause, would require action
by the individual states whenever a provision of a treaty dealt
with a matter normally governed by state law in the absence
of a treaty. It has been frequently pointed out that the
"which" clause would require state action with respect to the
implementation of many typical treaty provisions. Most im-
portant are those contained in the numerous commercial
treaties which we have negotiated with other nations. These
contain reciprocal privileges to engage in business, to own or
rent land, to form corporations, to have access to state courts,
and to other matters within state power in the absence of
treaty. Several such provisions were included, for example, in
our treaty with Italy in 1948,28 and in many other treaties
from the beginning of the government.
27 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), discussing the Commerce
clause.
28 For further discussion, see Chafee, supra note 25, at 364-68.
THE BRICKER AMENDMENT
When confronted with this evidence of the deleterious
effect of their proposed "which" clause on the negotiation and
enforcement of these desirable and typical provisions in com-
mercial treaties, they point to the fact that some commercial
treaties, current and past, contained provisions giving re-
ciprocal privileges only to the extent the law of each state
permitted.29 On the basis of this occasional practice, they
claim that such an arrangement should be made mandatory
for every treaty by their amendment. Quite the reverse is
true. When the national government can achieve national
objectives in this way, it may do so. But when the national
interest requires the granting of reciprocal privileges in all
the states in order to obtain similar privileges for Americans
abroad, then the national Government should have the power
to agree to such a provision. Their argument on this point
makes even clearer their fundamental belief that the states,
and not the nation, should determine the national interest in
foreign affairs.
The "which" clause might similarly affect special problems,
such as the right of inspection under the Baruch plan, control
of poppy-growing within a state under narcotics treaties, and
various detailed phases of international civil aviation. If
such a clause were in the Constitution, the Federal Govern-
ment would first have to determine with respect to every
doubtful treaty provision whether it or the states had the
power of enforcement. This determination would be subject
to a lengthy process of litigation to settle finally the
boundaries of power under the amendment which in turn
would create confusion and delay with respect to typical and
desirable treaty provisions.
Faced with all these objections, the proponents of the
"which" clause have argued that many of these provisions
29 See Linder, Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 26 STATE
DEP'T BuLL. 881 (1952), discussing post-World War II treaties of this type. See also
1853 treaty with France, 10 STAT. 992, 996 (1855).
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would not require action by the states if the Supreme Court
gave a broad construction to the commerce power. It is very
doubtful if this power could properly be extended far enough
to achieve this result. It is a strange argument indeed that
the Constitution should be amended to prevent the expansion
of the Federal Government under the treaty power if it is to
be so extended under the commerce power.3" If it were, it
would be expanded for all purposes, and not merely where
necessary to implement a valid treaty. Such a development
would be clearly undesirable.
Pressed with this contention, the proponents fall back
ultimately on the proposition that it is all right to leave the
decision on enforcement of such provisions to the states.3
As previously stated, this would mean that the individual
states rather than the national Government would determine
the national policy towards adoption of this type of treaty
provision. Stated thus baldly, the basic unworkability and
intent of the "which" clause is apparent.
"Parity" and the Treaty Power
A second major contention that an amendment of the
treaty power is necessary rests on the reiterated assertion
that the United States is not on a parity with other nations
in its procedures for giving internal effect to treaties. Refer-
ence is most frequently made to the requirement in Great
Britain for parliamentary action before British treaties have
internal effect.
The alleged defect in our present constitutional arrange-
ment is said to rest on the construction that the Supreme
30 See Schweppe, Hearings, supra note 4, at 70: "If they go too far, [in extend-
ing the commerce power] maybe sometime we will have to amend the Constitution
again. But I do look for that sort of expansion."
31 See Schweppe, Hearings, supra note 4, at 69, 70: "I think the State of Wash-
ington should have the right to determine whether Frenchmen or Russians or any-
body else can own land in the State of Washington and not the State Department
with the consent of the Senate."
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Court has given to the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Under that clause, treaties, once duly approved by two-thirds
of the Senators present, and ratified by the President, become
operative internally at once if the terms of the treaty show
such an intention. If the terms show a contrary intent then
further legislation is required before internal effectiveness
can be achieved. Under existing law and practice, terms re-
quiring further legislation can be inserted in the course of
negotiation, or later by the Senate itself as a condition of its
approval. Furthermore, the President can postpone proclaim-
ing the treaty effective until the other signatories have acted.
Moreover, under international law, the nation undertakes an
obligation to enforce the treaty and a failure to do so con-
stitutes a breach of the treaty under international law.32
Despite these considerations, the Bricker amendment pro-
vides that any treaty provision having internal effect must be
authorized by legislation in addition to the existing require-
ment of approval by the Senate. No necessity for these addi-
tional steps in every case has been shown. Under our present
practice, many treaties, especially the conventional commer-
cial treaties previously referred to, do not require these addi-
tional steps. These treaties are in our national interest, and
our current procedures for making them effective are con-
venient, expeditious, and facilitate their negotiation.
The assertion that such a cumbersome procedure is neces-
sary to put us on a parity with other countries cannot be
sustained.3 No fair comparison can be made with countries
having a parliamentary form of government. In such coun-
tries, the executive and the legislative functions are ordinarily
combined in the majority party. Having negotiated a treaty,
parliamentary approval, concurrently with its ratification or
32 See 5 BACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-85 (1943).
33 For a thorough discussion see Preuss, On Amending the Treaty-Making
Power: A Comparative Study of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 51 MIcH.
L.R xv. 1117 (1953).
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thereafter, is usually easier to obtain than the approval of
two-thirds of the Senators present'under our system. Further-
more, this Senate approval is a legislative act34 in the same
sense as approval by a majority of Parliament in Great
Britain.
Comparison of these procedures must also take into ac-
count whether the government in question is unitary or
federal. Under the unitary form of government, no problem
of state law is involved. In a federal system such as ours, it is
necessary that the treaty provisions become effective within
the states. The very purpose of the Supremacy clause was to
ensure that the national policy embodied in treaties should
override inconsistent state law.
The framers of our Constitution rejected decisively a pro-
posal that participation by the House of Representatives in
the treaty process should be required before a treaty could
become binding internationally or internally.35 While the
Bricker provision on legislation is technically directed only to
internal effectiveness, similar considerations as to the de-
sirability of House participation would seem applicable.36 In
any case, if the greater complexity of modern treaties and the
frequent necessity for appropriations in which the House has
the major role make desirable the re-examination of this
question, then an amendment requiring majority approval
of a treaty by both branches of Congress in place of approval
by the Senate alone would be more reasonable than the
Bricker proposal of imposing both steps for every provision
having internal effect. Such an amendment has been proposed
by the House in the past, but has never won the approval of
the Senate."
34 THE FEDERALIST, No. 64 (Jay), presents an early assertion of this point.
35 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 392, 538 (1911).
36 See treatment of this question in the article by members of the American Bar
Association's Peace and Law Committee - Mess'rs Hatch, Finch and Ober, The
Treaty Power and the Constitution: The Case for Amendment, 40 A.B.A.J. 207
(1954).
37 E.g., H.J. RES. 60, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1954), discussed in Borchard, The
Proposed Constitutional Amendment on Treaty-Making, 39 A.J. INT'L L. 537 (1945).
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If this Bricker requirement of additional legislation for
every provision having internal effect is coupled with the
"which" clause in that same amendment, state legislation
would also be mandatory for each provision having internal
effect in a matter governed by state law in the absence of a
treaty. These combined requirements would give this country
the most unworkable procedure in the world for the enforce-
ment of treaties rather than putting us on a parity, as the
proponents assert.
Canada is the only other country which now has a proced-
ure for enforcing treaties that embodies either of the require-
ments of the Bricker amendment. Since 1937, the Canadian
Parliament has not been able to enforce treaty provisions
concerning matters subject to Provincial competence apart
from treaty. Canada has the usual provision in a parliamen-
tary form of government requiring legislation before treaties
have internal effect. Unlike the Bricker amendment, there is
no requirement that a branch of the national legislature
should pass on the same treaty twice with differing majorities.
One approval by a majority of Parliament suffices.
Any comparison with the Canadian procedure should take
note of the fact that Canadian federalism differs from ours.
Their national government has all powers not assigned to the
Provinces. Secondly, this system is relatively new in Canada
and was the result of a decision s by the Privy Council com-
posed of Brifish, and not Canadian judges. Appeal to the
Privy Council has now been abolished in Canada. Finally,
Canadian professional opinion is overwhelmingly opposed to
this arrangement. 9 It should not be copied. It has not been
anywhere else."
38 Attorney General for Canada v. Attorney General for Ontario, [1937] A.C.
326.
39 E.g., MacDonald, The Canadian Constitution Seventy Years After, 15 CA
B. REv. 401 (1937); Scott, Centralization and Decentralization in Canadian Fed-
eralism, 29 CAN. B. REv. 1095 (1951).
40 See Young, Treaty Provisions in Foreign Constitutions, 38 A.B.A.J. 513
(1952), where it is stated that India once had a system similar to Canada's present
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The Bricker proponents have defended their suggested
method for making treaties internally effective by pointing
out correctly that international law is not directly concerned
with the ways in which an individual nation complies with its
obligation under international law to honor its treaty com-
mitments. Starting from this proposition, they have made the
further assertion that this provision of their amendment has
no effect on our international treaty-making process. But the
effective negotiation of treaties requires that our Government
be able to assure the other contracting parties that we are in
a position to give effect to the treaty with reasonable prompt-
ness. The enforcement of a treaty is just as, if not more, im-
portant than its initial negotiation. The cumbersome nature
of their proposal has been pointed out. Unless it is designed
to make the negotiation of treaties more difficult, what other
useful purpose can the additional requirements serve? We are
still bound by international law to honor our commitments.
Their proposal would increase the possibility that we would
not. To assert, under these circumstances, that their proposed
procedure for giving treaties internal effect will not interfere
with the ability of the President to negotiate treaties is a
dangerous half-truth. In practice, it would impede danger-
ously our ability to negotiate and honor necessary and desir-
able commitments.
Executive Agreements and Separation of Powers
The discussion thus far has concerned the proposed changes
in our treaty-making procedure. The Bricker amendment also
undertakes to alter the existing constitutional arrangements
for the making of international agreements other than
treaties. These other international commitments are common-
ly referred to as executive agreements. That amendment
gives power to Congress to control all agreements. It also pro-
procedure on matters of provincial law, but has changed it so that their present
system resembles our constitutional methods on this federal-state question.
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vides that the restrictions placed on treaties by requiring
Congressional legislation before any provision can have
internal effect as well as state legislation when a provision
concerns matters governed by state law in absence of treaty,
should also apply to executive agreements. For reasons stated
more fully elsewhere,4 it is believed that these procedures
would needlessly hamper proper uses of executive agree-
ments. They would certainly interfere with the ability of the
President in his role as "Commander-in-Chief" and "organ
for foreign affairs" to act decisively in emergency situations
in war and peace.
There is no specific provision for the making of executive
agreements in the Constitution. The Constitution, however,
expressly forbids42 the individual states from entering into
"agreements" as well as treaties, thus showing the familiarity
of the framers with agreements other than treaties. Further-
more, such agreements have been a common practice from the
very beginning of our government under the Constitution.
The Constitution furnishes no explicit guide as to the cir-
cumstances under which the treaty process would be requir-
ed.43 Practice and the opinion of some competent authorities
44
suggest that the treaty procedure is normally necessary in
matters involving important policy issues, whereas executive
agreements based exclusively on independent Presidential
authority deal typically with less basic questions except in
emergencies. Other competent authorities45 have argued that
41 The reasons may be found in MacChesney, Mathews, McDougal, Oliver and
Ribble, supra note 24.
42 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 10: "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation.... No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, . .. enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power ... "
43 U.S. CoNsT. Art. II, § 2: "He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
concur .... 1
44 See 2 HYDE, INTENATIoNAL LAW 1416 (2d ed. 1945).
45 See McCLuRE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 364, 386 (1941);
McDougal and Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agree-
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the executive agreement procedure is "interchangeable" with
the treaty process. The Supreme Court has never had oc-
casion to decide which view is correct. It has never seemed
reasonable to this writer that the specific constitutional re-
quirements for treaty approval are not mandatory in proper
cases. Otherwise, why put the treaty procedure specifically in
the Constitution? The hard problem is of course to determine
the proper cases.
The existence of some differentiation is understandable. It
is extra-ordinarily difficult, however, to suggest a distinction
that would not shackle the existing power of the President to
act independently in emergencies and in borderline cases. The
Bricker amendment would vest in Congress power to control
all "executive and other agreements." "Other agreements"
would include power to control the making of treaties as well.
The proponents urge that this broad authority is necessary in
order to prevent the use of executive agreements "in lieu" of
treaties. It should be emphasized that the proposed amend-
ment itself makes no effort to furnish the proper formula for
resolving this difficult question. On the contrary, the amend-
ment asserts abstractly the power of Congress to determine
this fundamental matter. The ultimate solution would rest
with future Congresses.
The proponents argue that their amendment merely re-
states the existing power of Congress. This assertion is unten-
able. Unquestionably, Congress possesses the power to super-
sede the internal effect of any international agreement.46 It
may also authorize the President to enter into international
commitments. This is a far cry from the power to direct the
President as to what international agreements he must or
ments: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy, 54 YALE L.j. 181 and 534
(1945); Cf. Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements - A Reply, 54 YALE
L.J. 616 (1945).
46 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1947). Cf. Moser v. United States, 341
U.S. 41, 45 (1951), one of the latest cases to recognize this principle though not used
in deciding that case.
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must not make."' Nor is it equivalent to the power to control
the independent Presidential authority in foreign affairs. The
amendment is not restricted to the internal effect of agree-
ments. Consequently, it does not merely restate the power
of Congress. In actuality, it is a drastic and radical attempt to
change the existing balance of power in this area under the
Constitution.
In practice, the Congress either authorizes in advance or
approves by appropriations or otherwise the overwhelming
majority of agreements. It has been estimated that the pro-
portion reaches 85 per cent or more.4" The critical question
concerns the balance. Many of these are routine. In wartime
and other emergencies, the President should be able to act
decisively in the national interest. The Berlin air lift is an
excellent example. The advocates of amendment argue that
Yalta and Potsdam prove their thesis. The issue is whether
we should amend the Constitution and not over the merits of
these particular past agreements. The real question is what
restrictions Congress would make in advance of a conference
with fighting allies that would curb the authority of the Presi-
dent to make commitments. In war, no authorization to agree
might be worse than permitting action, however unwise in
retrospect.
Different Shades of "Pink"
The proponents argue that their proposal on executive
agreements is necessary because of past abuses. In addition
to the arguments already cited, they point with alarm to cer-
tain Supreme Court decisions as having made the use of the
executive agreement more dangerous now than it was origin-
47 See Schweppe, Hearings, supra note 3, at 74, where he makes clear that
"regulate" in the amendment is intended to include "prohibit."
48 E.g., SEN. REP., supra note 4, at 31. See also, Hearings, supra note 4, at 247
n. 56, for report on S. J. Res. 130 (earlier Bricker proposal) of Association of the
Bar of the City of New York - Committee on Federal Legislation and Committee
on International Law.
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ally. Chief reliance is placed on United States v. Pink,4 9 in-
volving the Roosevelt-Litvinov exchange of letters in con-
nection with the recognition of the Soviet Government by the
United States in 1933. Recognition is admittedly an exclusive
Presidential function. In connection with the recognition,
however, an assignment by Russia to the United States of
whatever claims Russia had in the United States was made.
Acting purportedly in pursuance of that assignment, the
United States initiated litigation involving the distribution of
surplus funds of the New York branch of a Russian insurance
company that had been nationalized by the Soviet Govern-
ment by a decree that attempted to cover the New York
assets. All creditors who had done business with the New
York branch had been paid. The controversy was between
creditors who had dealt with branches outside of the United
States and the claim of the United States under the assign-
ment. The highest New York court had ordered distribution
to these foreign creditors. ° On appeal to the Supreme Court,
it was held that the executive agreement coupled with the
assignment expressed our national policy and that this policy
was supreme over state law to the contrary. This result was
reached by giving to executive agreements the overriding
effect of the Supremacy Clause although executive agree-
ments are not mentioned in that Clause. Chief Justice Stone,
in a dissent joined by Justice Roberts, disagreed.5 The princi-
pal basis for their dissent was that the agreement did not
constitute a clear expression of a national policy to overrule
state law on such a question. If not so expressed, state law
should prevail. They agreed it would override state law if
49 315 U.S. 203 (1942). They also cite United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937), containing broad language by Mr. Justice Sutherland in a case dealing with
the same assignment as the Pink case; and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), again containing broad language by Mr. Justice Suther-
land. The latter case involved, however, only a delegation of power to the President
by Congress.
5o United States v. Pink, 284 N.Y. 555, 32 N.E.2d 552 (1940).
51 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242, 249 (1942).
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such a consequence had been intended and had been made
explicit.
The proponents of the Bricker amendment not only have
criticized the case on this supremacy aspect but have vigor-
ously asserted that the case also held that the executive agree-
ment was superior to the Fifth Amendment. If true, this
would support their other arguments that international agree-
ments can override the Constitution. This contention is inac-
curate. The majority opinion denied specifically any such
doctrine." What the Court asserted was that the Fifth
Amendment was not applicable on the ground the assignment
marshalled claims of all American creditors of Russia in
preference to creditors whose claims arose outside of the
United States. This was analogized to the similiar preference
of local creditors by one state as against creditors in other
states which has been held a valid discrimination under
similar provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is signi-
ficant that the lower federal courts in similar situations aris-
ing subsequent to the principal decision have followed the
supremacy aspect of the case but have not regarded the
opinion as holding that executive agreements can override
the Fifth Amendment.53
While executive agreements are supreme over inconsistent
state law if so intended, it is doubtfui that executive agree-
ments have similar validity if inconsistent with prior Congres-
sional action. This particular question has not been con-
sidered by our highest tribunal. In a recent case in the Fourth
Court of Appeals,54 now pending on appeal in the Supreme
52 Id., 315 U.S. at 228.
53 See Note, United States v. Pink - a Reappraisal, 48 CoL. L. REV. 890 (1948),
for discussion and citation of cases. The statement in the text is believed accurate
even though two of these lower court decisions gave relief when there were local
creditors. This was not because the Fifth Amendment was overridden, but because
the National policy was held to have set aside the state policy as to local creditors.
54 United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
74 Sup. Ct. 135 (1953). See also, Sutherland, The Bricker Amendment, Executive
Agreements, and Imported Potatoes, 67 HARv. L. REV. 281 (1953).
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Court, it was held that executive agreements are subject to
prior federal policy enunciated by Congress. This policy must
be within Congress' power to determine. Such a result would
be desirable, and it is to be hoped that the Supreme Court
will so decide.
The existing law on executive agreements would seem to
be reasonably satisfactory, especially if, as the writer be-
lieves, Chief Justice Stone's opinion in the Pink case is
followed. Such a view is a necessary implication of federal-
ism, wholly apart from the Supremacy Clause. Certainly
no case has been made for an amendment drastically chang-
ing the existing balance of powers, and transferring respon-
sibility for the direction of foreign policy from the President
to Congress. The current difficulties in France, where the
executive power has lost effective control over foreign policy,
should demonstrate the folly of making such a radical change
in our present workable arrangements.
Substitute Proposals and Minor Provisions
While this article is devoted primarily to the Bricker
amendment as reported out by the Judiciary Committee of
the Senate, a milder substitute amendment for regulating
executive agreements was introduced by Senator George and
had substantial support failing by only one vote from receiv-
ing the necessary two-thirds.5 Unlike the Bricker amend-
ment, it did not touch the traditional procedure for making
and enforcing treaties. It provides that other international
agreements shall have internal effect only by act of Con-
gress. 6 This would still interfere with the independent Presi-
dential authority as "Commander-in-Chief" and as "the
55 100 CONG. REc. 2251 (Feb. 26, 1954).
56 Section 2 of the George Amendment reads as follows: "An international
agreement other than a treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United
States only by an act of the Congress." A similar proposal by McCarran uses
"legislation" in place of "act of the Congress." This raises the danger of state legis-
lation as under the "which clause."
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organ for foreign affairs" " which is requisite for dealing
with emergencies in war and peace, to say nothing of periods
of "cold war." Limitations of space prevent further discus-
sion of this proposal. There have been no hearings on it that
would give light as to its probable effect. Adoption of the late
Chief Justice Stone's opinion in the Pink case would provide
adequate safeguard against improvident overruling of state
law. No further restrictions on this necessary executive
authority in emergencies should be adopted without full
hearings.
A new proposal by Senator Bricker, introduced in the Sen-
ate on February 4, 1954, combines in a new Section 3 s the
George mandatory requirement of legislation by Congress
before any executive agreement can have internal effect with
a similiar requirement for treaties unless a two-thirds vote of
the Senate on a treaty provides specifically to the contrary.
His new proposal abandons the "which" clause, the assertion
of power in Congress to control both external and internal
aspects of all agreements, and the mandatory non-self-
executing clause as applied to treaties.
There remain serious objections. As discussed hereafter,
there is danger of reintroducing the "which" clause idea in
the apparently harmless provision that international agree-
ments shall not conflict with the Constitution. Furthermore,
as with the George proposal previously mentioned, the effect
of the new Section 3 on the powers given by the Constitution
to the President as "Commander- in- Chief" and as "the
organ for foreign affairs" are uncertain and could interfere
seriously with this necessary power for use in emergencies.
57 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
58 Section 3 of the new Bricker proposal reads as follows: "A treaty or other
international agreement shall become effective as internal law in the United States
only through legislation by the Congress unless in advising and consenting to a
treaty the Senate, by a vote of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting, shall
provide that such treaty may become effective as internal law without legislation
by the Congress."
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As with the George proposal, it should not be adopted with-
out full hearings.
Finally, both the Bricker amendment and his new proposal
provides that no provision of a treaty or other international
agreement may conflict with the Constitution. This of course
ought to be the law. While the Supreme Court has never
found a treaty to be unconstitutional, the course of decision
throughout its history indicates clearly that fundamental
constitutional guarantees will be protected. One case59 in-
volving the prohibition amendment raised the question but
the case did not reach the Supreme Court, on the ground
the objectors did not have the necessary direct interest to
raise the point. Thus there is no-substantial basis for the
claim that the Bill of Rights is endangered by "treaty law." "
The proponents argue that, if there is any doubt, the Con-
stitution should be amended to make certain that this is the
law. Our common law tradition reflects the conviction that
it is unwise to codify the course of decision, especially in a
Constitution. A more important objection is the possibility
that this provision might be construed in the future as intend-
ed to reverse the doctrine of Missouri v. Holland. Although
it has been shown that this decision did not in any way violate
the Constitution, the constant assertion to the contrary by
the proponents raises this danger. Since the course of debate
thus far in the Senate has revealed that the "which" clause
will undoubtedly not be accepted in its present form, it is
important that this dangerous proposal should not reappear
in an apparently harmless provision. Some recent alternative
proposals introduced on the floor of the Senate without hear-
50 Milliken v. Stone, 16 F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 748
(1927).
60 In the early stages of the debate, it was argued that the First Amendment
only restricted "Congress." For fuller statement of reasons why this textual argu-
ment is unwarranted, see article cited MacChesney, etc, supra note 24. There is not
even this textual basis for any other provision of the Bill of Rights. The text has
discussed their claim as to the Fifth Amendment in the Pink case, and the Tenth
Amendment in Missouri v. Holland.
THE BRICKER AMENDMENT
ings provide that treaties must be made "in pursuance" of the
Constitution.6 This language suggests an even greater dan-
ger of an indirect reintroduction of the "which" clause idea
based on the proponent's construction of Missouri v. Holland.
Such a provision should also be rejected. The Constitution
should only be amended when the need is clearly demon-
strated. There is no more need in this instance than there
would be for the inclusion of a restatement of the doctrine of
Marbury v. Madison."
Much Ado About Very Little
Only the major contentions of the Bricker proponents have
been discussed. Many of their other arguments that are con-
stantly advanced both in the hearings and in debates do not
warrant extended treatment. Frequent reference is made to
"cover 200" treaties pending in the United Nations." In
response to an inquiry from the New York Times, the State
Department has stated that the number of pending treaties
that have been concluded with the sponsorship of the United
Nations is fifty-four rather than two hundred. Of this total of
fifty-four, only six have been signed by the United States. All
six deal with conventional treaty subjects. Eighteen of these
treaties that have been opened for signature we have refused
to sign.64
Another constant reference65 is to a recent State Depart-
ment pamphlet called "Our Foreign Policy" 66 designed to
61 E.g., Section 1 of Senator McCarran reads as follows: "After the ratification
of this amendment no treaty shall be the supreme law of the land unless made in
pursuance of this Constitution." This is coupled with a Section 2 which is identical
with Section 1 of the Bricker Amendment. Under these circumstances, "pursuance"
presents a real danger of being intended to overrule Missouri v. Holland.
62 1 Cranch 137 (U.S. 1803), instituting the doctrine of judicial review of legis-
lation.
63 E.g., SEN. REp., supra note 4, at 5; Hearings, supra note 4, at 10. (Sen.
Bricker).
64 Inquiry by Arthur Krock to the State Department, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1954,
§ 1, p. 18, col. 5.
65 E.g., Holman, Hearings, supra note 4, at 144, 147; SEN. RE., supra note 4,
at S.
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acquaint the general public with our goals and problems in
foreign affairs. It opens with a sentence that "there is no
longer any real distinction between domestic and foreign
affairs." President Truman wrote a foreword recommending
the pamphlet to the American people. This statement is used
to imply that the government was officially abolishing as a
matter of law the distinction between domestic and foreign
affairs in our governmental system. In context, it carries no
such inference. The pamphlet attempts to show that our posi-
tion as the leading world power makes everything we do and
say and what we do or do not do a matter of world interest.
World reactions to our statements and actions affect our
foreign policy. This is true. It is not true that the pamphlet
is a statement of a new juristic position.
Another favorite argument 7 is based on the dissenting
opinion of the late Chief Justice Vinson and two other Jus-
tices in the Steel Seizure case.68 Here again, the impression is
created that the opinion stated that the United Nations Char-
ter was the principal legal basis for the seizure. A fair reading
of the whole dissenting opinion would suggest that the Char-
ter and other treaties were referred to as part of the back-
ground on which Congress had legislated, and that the dis-
sent in fact relied on Congressional acts as the legal ground
for upholding the seizure.
Finally, great stress is laid on the remarks made at Louis-
ville by Mr. Dulles while a private citizen and before becom-
ing Secretary of State.69 While his opening remarks0 on that
occasion were indeed broad and in my opinion erroneous, no
66 State Dep't Publication No. 3972 (Foreign Affairs Policy Series 26, Sept.
1950).
67 E.g., SEN. REP., supra note 4, at 5; Senator Bricker, Hearings, supra note 4,
at 234.
68 Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 667 (1952).
69 E.g., SEN. REP., supra note 4, at 5; Hearings, supra note 4, at 49 (Schweppe)
and 147 (Holman).
70 Pertinent parts of Dulles' Louisville, Ky., speech are reprinted in Hearings,
supra note 4, at 862 et seq.
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reference is ever made by the Bricker proponents to a sub-
sequent statement in the same speech that there was room
for honest differences of opinion as to the need for a con-
stitutional amendment and that the whole problem should
be "thoroughly explored." " Further capital is sought in the
fact that Mr. Dulles has opposed the amendment since be-
coming Secretary of State." Such "inconsistency" is thor-
oughly deplored. No mention is made of the fact that neither
Senator Bricker's original bill nor his revised version intro-
duced in 1953"s contained the "which" clause and that Sen.
Bricker had opposed its inclusion,74 although now it is the
heart of his amendment.
Two Good Arguments Overstated
Despite the character of some of the arguments the pro-
ponents have made for their amendment, two contentions of
substance remain that warrant further discussion. One is the
nature of the treaty power. While their constant assertion
that the treaty power is unlimited is not sustainable, it re-
mains true that agreements regulating matters of genuine
international concern and which do not violate any funda-
mental constitutional guarantees may gradually extend the
area of national control over matters formerly governed by
the states. This same expansion has of course also taken place
under the purely domestic powers of Congress. Both develop-
ments are the result of the growing complexity of the world
in which we live rather than the fruit of some dark plot.
On the basis of this probable gradual expansion of national
functions, the proponents have pushed the point to its utmost
logical end. Using Articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations
71 Id. at 863.
72 Id. at 823 et seq., testimony of Secretary of State Dulles.
73 Id. at 1.
74 Id. at 117 (Senator Bricker); Dispatch by William S. White quoting alleged
private correspondence of Senator Bricker to other Senators in February of 1953
specifically opposing the "which" clause. N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1954, p. 20, col. 2.
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Charter which pledge the members of the United Nations to
take joint and separate action for the promotion of long-
range goals in the social, economic, cultural, and human rights
fields, they argue that this authorizes legislation taking over
control of all business, all education, all labor, all civil rights,
and all professions. 5 Articles 55 and 56 have been held to be
non-self-executing as previously stated. 6 They might none-
theless in theory be the basis of some future Congressional
action. There is certainly no duty to enact specific legislation
under these Articles. The only answer to the fears generated
by this possibility is a sense of balance, and confidence in the
American people and their officials. Whenever the objective
of proper international regulation can be achieved through
the use of a "federal-state" clause," as in the International
Labor Organization practice,7 this expansion of national
power can be avoided. Our government has already refused
to sign numerous UN treaties which, if adopted, would have
expanded federal power. 9 Logic is never pushed to extremes
in the practical affairs of men.
The other question of substance lies in the area of execu-
tive agreements. The failure of the Constitution to define the
line between the proper use of executive agreements and the
situations where the treaty process requiring Senate approval
should be mandatory has been noted. The proposed amend-
ment would vest in Congress the entire power to determine
this line and answer this very difficult question. 0 Under our
75 SEN. REP., supra note 4, at 14, 15; Hearings, supra note 4, at 76.
76 Sei Fujfi v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
77 For discussion of the "federal-state" clause, see Sorenson, Federal States and
the International Protection of Human Rights, 46 Am. J. INT'L L. 195 (1952).
78 See Turlington, The Human Rights Commission at the Crossroads, 45 Am. J.
INT'L L. 534 (1951), urging the use of this approach for the Human Rights Cov-
enants.
79 See note 64 supra.
80 Compare the earlier statement of Senator Bricker in Hearings, supra note 4,
at 29: "Should the executive branch be unduly restricted, one of two things would
happen. Observance of an unduly rigid constitutional provision might seriously
interfere with the conduct of the Nation's foreign affairs. This fact would tend to
place a high premium on evasion of the Fundamental law." (emphasis supplied).
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existing constitutional arrangements, the question is left in
doubt. On the one hand, there is the general constitutional
system in domestic affairs whereby the power to legislate and
appropriate is delegated to the legislative branch. On the
other hand, the Constitution delegates the executive power
to the President in his role as the "Chief Executive." The
President under the Constitution is also "Commander-in-
Chief" of the armed forces and the "organ for foreign af-
fairs," derived from his power to send and receive diplomatic
officers. The latter two are the chief sources of presidential
authority in this area. This apparent conflict between differ-
ent objectives and different parts of the Constitution is not
unique nor is it new. Throughout our history there has been
a constant struggle between the executive and the legislative
branches for the power to control foreign policy.
The same struggle has occurred in the purely domestic
arena with the same results. An accommodation of such con-
troversies has been reached in practice. The nature of this
adjustment varies with the problems and times. A similar
problem of a domestic nature concerns the power of the
President to remove officers of the Government. The power
to remove could be regarded as a function of the execution of
the laws, as an incident of the appointing authority, as a
"necessary or proper" function of Congress, or, finally, as
nonexisting save for the power of impeachment, the only
specific reference to the question in the Constitution."1
Despite the fundamental nature of the problem, it was not
until 1926 that the Supreme Court first dealt directly with
the question. In Myers v. United States,2 the Court held that
the President had the power to remove a postmaster appoint-
ed with the consent of the Senate. The breadth of the holding
These are wise remarks and they would seem equally applicable to "unduly rigid"
statutory regulation under the Bricker Amendment.
81 See discussion of this question in TnE CONSTrTUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMyERICA, Revised and Annotated, 455-460 (Corwin ed. 1952).
82 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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suggested the President could remove any officer he had
appointed except United States judges. This threatened the
independence of the regulatory commissions created by Con-
gress. In 1935, in Humphrey v. United States,83 the Supreme
Court decided that the President's power did not extend to
the removal of a member of the Federal Trade Commission.
In this holding, the Court stressed the nature of the office
held. Which officers in the Federal Government come within
the Myers case and which are governed by the Humphrey
ruling is uncertain. Other questions in this area also remain
unsettled. In dealing with governmental problems of this
character, whether in domestic or foreign affairs, this prac-
tical course is workable and wise. Here again, logical ab-
stractions should be avoided.
Bricker Objectives - No "New" Treaties and
Congressional Control of Foreign Policy
This discussion of the proposals and arguments of the
Bricker proponents suggests that their broad objectives are
twofold. With respect to the treaty-making process, their
primary complaint is as to the "new type of treaty" with
particular reference to treaties originating in the United
Nations. These "new" treaties are asserted to deal with
economic, social, and human rights questions which were not
formerly the subject of international agreement. They claim
these matters are not proper subjects of international regula-
tion."8 Their presentation reveals no serious objection to the
conventional bilateral commercial treaties. Early in the 1953
Hearings, Senator Bricker suggested putting the word "Mul-
tipartite" 85 into the wording advocated by the American Bar
Association in order to permit commercial treaties to be
adopted under the present constitutional procedure. This was
83 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
84 Hearings, supra note 4, at 219, 395, 729 (Senator Dirksen) and 1263
(Schweppe).
85 Id. at 8, 15.
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apparently not acceptable to the spokesmen for the American
Bar Association. In order to prevent what they consider as
"bad" treaties, they are content to make more difficult the
negotiation and enforcement of non-controversial treaties.
As Father Conway has said in America, the Bricker amend-
ment would not prevent us from making treaties: it would
only prevent us from making effective treaties." If "bad"
treaties are negotiated, the place to stop them is in the
Senate. The Senate has always been cautious in approving
treaties. The Constitution does not need amendment to
achieve this objective.
The second broad purpose of the proponents is to curb
the authority of the President over the direction of foreign
policy and vest this control in Congress and even in the state
legislatures on matters normally governed by state law. The
reasons for believing this view unsound- have been stated
previously. The present agreement-making process is subject
to adequate controls. Congress can immediately supersede
by statute the internal effect of any international agreement
they consider unwise." The Supreme Court will invalidate
any provisions of an international agreement that violate
basic constitutional guarantees.8 No amendment is needed to
prevent abuse of the necessary Presidential control over the
direction of foreign policy.
Conclusion
The present is no time to cripple the power of the nation
in foreign affairs. The Bricker proposals are essentially
negative. They would prevent us from playing our vital and
necessary role as the leader of the free world struggle against
the threat of international Communism. No obstacle should
be erected that would prevent our effective use of the agree-
86 Conway, "Darling Daughter" Amendment, 90 AmERICA 415 (Jan. 23, 1954).
87 See note 46 supra.
88 MacChesney, etc, supra, note 24. See note 60 supra.
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ment-making process in forming and maintaining the alliances
necessary to win that struggle. Nor should obstacles be placed
in the way of negotiating through the United Nations or else-
where agreements that would help to alleviate basic condi-
tions of poverty and misery that are the ultimate causes of
war. These are times that call for constructive, courageous,
and imaginative leadership. 9 If the rule of law which we
cherish at home is to be gradually extended to the world
order, an effective agreement-making power is essential for
its achievement. Force should not be the only effective means
for adjusting differences. Peace and justice under law has
been our fortunate heritage. Fate has made it our destiny to
be the leader in seeking to make this heritage the prized
possession of all mankind.
Brunson MacChesney*
89 What better forum than the United Nations could there have been for Presi-
dent Eisenhower's recent challenging proposals for an international pool of fission-
able materials for peaceful uses?
90 Since the original writing of this article last Winter all pending amendments
were rejected in the Senate, the proposal of Senator George losing by one vote, see
note 55 supra. A motion for reconsideration has been filed, but as of the middle of
August, no action had been taken thereon.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
